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I. INTRODUCTION
The debate over the legitimacy of spendthrift provisions in trusts
began well over a century ago.' Although it can be fairly character-
Copyright held by NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW.
* Associate Professor of Law, Georgia State University; B.A., Old Dominion Uni-
versity; J.D. with distinction, Lamar School of Law, Emory University. The au-
thor would like to thank Dean Marjorie Girth and Georgia State University for
supporting this project with a research grant, and Carla Dudeck whose able ser-
vice as a research assistant greatly facilitated the completion of this paper.
1. I date the controversy from the dictum by Justice Miller in Nicholas v. Eaton, 91
U.S. 716 (1875), which provoked John Chipman Gray to author RESTRAINTS ON
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ized as having generated at least as much light as heat, it has gener-
ated a good deal of heat. The intensity of John Chipman Gray's
reaction to Justice Miller's approval of the concept in Nichols v. Ea-
ton2 can hardly be exaggerated. It has been variously described as
"outrage"3 and "trauma,"4 and his response5 has been called a bitter
denunciation,6 a diatribe, and an intemperate tirade.8
Gray himself expresses the astonishment, even shock, he exper-
ienced upon reading Nichols v. Eaton's endorsement of spendthrift
provisions, which he revisited several years later upon reading Broad-
way Nat' Bank v. Adams,9 in which the Massachusetts Supreme
Court embraced what had been dictum and confirmed it as law.10
THE ALIENATION OF PROPERTY, the first edition of which he published in 1883. As
other commentators have noted, the debate persists. "Restraints on alienation of
trust interests have been strenuously debated for decades. The crux of this de-
bate has been fairness to creditors, since one of the primary objectives of trust
alienation restrictions is to prevent creditors of a beneficiary from obtaining any
interest in the trust." Jamie 0. Harris, Spendthrift and Forfeiture Clauses Stop
Runaway Bankruptcy Villain, 3 PROB. AND PROP. 20,22 (March-April 1989). See
also Laurene M. Brooks, Comment, A Tort-Creditor Exception to the Spendthrift
Trust Doctrine: A Call to the Wisconsin Legislature, 73 MARQ. L. REv. 108, 110
(1989); Willard M. Bushman, The (In)validity of Spendthrift Trusts, 47 OR. L.
REv. 304 (1968).
One commentator suggests that the debate persists because "Gray's criticism
of the spendthrift trust has been generally rejected without being completely re-
solved." A Rationale for the Spendthrift Trust, 64 CoLUM. L. REV. 1323, 1325
(1964).
Another contends that the debate is irreconcilable: "The historical account
offered here suggests that within the individualistic regime of consolidated prop-
erty there is no objective basis for choosing between the autonomy of the donor
and that of the donee, the dead hand dilemma; any resolution of that problem is a
'naked preference.'" Gregory S. Alexander, The Dead Hand and the Law of
Trusts in the Nineteenth Century, 37 STAN. L. REv. 1189, 1193 (1985).
2. 91 U.S. 716 (1875).
3. JESSE DUKEMINIER & STANLEY M. JOHANSON, WILLS, TRUSTS AND ESTATES 548
(4th ed. 1990); Alexander, supra note 1, at 1206.
4. Lawrence M. Friedman, The Dynastic Trust, 73 YALE L.J. 547, 574 (1964).
5. JOHN CHIPMAN GRAY, RESTRAINTS ON THE ALIENATION OF PROPERTY (1883).
6. Friedman, supra note 4, at 574.
7. George P. Costigan, Jr., Those Protective Trusts Which Are Miscalled 'Spend-
thrift Trusts' Reexamined, 22 CAL. L. REV. 471, 478 (1934).
8. Id. at 488.
9. 133 Mass. 170 (1882).
10. If there is one sentiment, therefore, which it would seem to be the part
of all in authority, and particularly of all judges, to fortify, it is the duty
of keeping one's promises and paying one's debts....
When, therefore, the Supreme Court went out its way to announce
that it now repudiated its former doctrine, and that it wished it to be
known that property could be fenced about as to secure to it the charac-
teristics of right and enjoyment to the beneficiary and immunity to his
creditors, the words came to many persons with a shock. Nor was the
shock lessened when the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts,
pushing the new doctrine to its extremist limits, held that a man's inter-
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While Gray gives full rein to the strength of his conviction, he is ever
the gentleman and colleague in the presentation of his argument even
as he twists the knife.11 However, no one lays greater claim to the
traits of temperance and collegiality than the other major writer on
the topic, Erwin Griswold.' 2
As early as 1895, Gray conceded defeat when he recognized the
readiness of courts and legislatures to follow the lead of the United
States Supreme Court and the Supreme Court of the Commonwealth
of Massachusetts and place their imprimatur upon the concept of the
spendthrift trust.1 3 Gray had lost the major battle. Nichols v. Eaton
and Broadway Natl Bank were relied upon to establish the legitimacy
of spendthrift provisions, and received overwhelming acceptance.14
Creditors of beneficiaries of spendthrift trusts have not given up, how-
est in trust property could be protected from his creditors by simply say-
ing that it should be.
I have written other things, for one motive or another, but this essay
wrote itself. While I was musing, the fire burned.
JOHN CHIPMAN GRAY, RESTRAINTS ON THE ALIENATION OF PROPERTY, iii-iv (2d ed.
1895).
11. "My modest task has been to show, [sic] that spendthrift trusts have no place in
the system of the Common Law. But I am no prophet, and certainly do not mean
to deny that they may be in entire harmony with the Social Code of the next
century. Dirt is only matter out of place; and what is a blot on the escutcheon of
the Common Law may be a jewel in the crown of the Social Republic." Id. at x.
12. Griswold authored two articles on spendthrift trusts before publishing his trea-
tise. Erwin N. Griswold, Reaching the Interest of the Beneficiary of a Spendthrift
Trust, 43 HARV. L. REV. 63 (1929)(hereinafter "Griswold, Reaching the Interest");
Erwin N. Griswold, Spendthrift Trusts Created in Whole or in Part for the Bene-
fit of the Settlor, 44 HARv. L. REv. 203 (1930)(hereinafter "Griswold, Spendthrift
Trusts"). He published his treatise in 1936. ERWIN N. GRISWOLD, SPENDTHRIFr
TRUSTS, (1936)(hereinafter "GRISWOLD TREATISE"). The second edition was pub-
lished in 1947. Unless otherwise noted, references to the treatise in this paper are
to the second edition.
13. GRAY, supra note 10, at iv-v.
14. A 1984 survey concluded that 42 states and the District of Columbia recognized
the validity of spendthrift provisions, albeit to varying extents. William S. Huff,
Spendthrift Clauses: Legality and Effect on Post-Transfer Estate Planning, 1984
V. MIAzI PHILIp E. HECKERING INsT. ON EST. PLAN. 1205.2. Of the five states
identified as not recognizing them (Georgia, New Hampshire, North Carolina,
Ohio and Rhode Island), id. at § 1205.3, Georgia and Rhode Island have since
adopted statutes recognizing spendthrift provisions, GA. CODE. ANN. § 53-12-28
(Michie Supp. 1992) and R.I. GEN. LAWS § 18-9.1-1 (1988), and the Supreme Court
of Ohio recognized their validity in 1991. Scott v. Bank One Trust Company, 577
N.E.2d 1077 (Ohio 1991), overruling Sherrow v. Brookover, 189 N.E.2d 90 (Ohio
1963). Three states, Alaska, Idaho and Wyoming, were identified as having not
addressed the issue. Huff, supra at 1 1205.4. Alaska recognizes spendthrift provi-
sions in one context: "A retirement plan exempt from claims under (a) of this
section is conclusively presumed to be a spendthrift trust under this section."
ALASKA STAT. § 9.38.017(d)(Supp. 1992).
See also William H. Wicker, Spendthrift Trusts, 10 GONZ. L. REv. 1, 4-5 (1974);
Note, A Rationale for the Spendthrift Trust, 64 COLUM. L. REv. 1323, 1323 n.4
(1964).
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ever. Instead, they have waged a war of attrition. The result in many
jurisdictions is a general rule confirming the validity of spendthrift
provisions, but subjecting them to a hodgepodge of exceptions. 15
The amount of money held in trust is virtually unimaginable. 16
Spendthrift provisions, whether one views them as abominations, nec-
essary evils, or socially efficacious and morally sound, are, as the song
goes, here to stay.17 They do not, however, place unbreachable de-
fenses around the assets of a trust. The same courts which first recog-
nized the legitimacy of spendthrift provisions balked when faced with
the claim of the dependent child seeking enforcement of an unpaid
judgement for child support.' 8 Other examples abound.19
The time has come to codify the compromise that has evolved
through over a century of litigation. 20 The settlor of a trust for an-
other person should be allowed to insulate the assets and distributions
of the trust from the beneficiaries' creditors, but only up to a point.
Some claims compel recognition on policy grounds. It is economically
counterproductive to require that each claimant litigate her entitle-
ment;2 ' at the same time, however, it is impossible to classify claims so
15. See, e.g., REsTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 157 (1959).
16. As of December 31, 1990, financial institutions held almost $538 billion in per-
sonal trust accounts, almost $23 billion in estate trust accounts, and over $1,370
billion in employee benefit trust accounts. FEDERAL FIN. INST. EXAMINATION
COUNCIL, WASHINGTON, D. C., TRUST ASSETS OF FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS (1990).
17. Bogert concludes that: "[]he general validity of spendthrift restraints has be-
come established in a majority of jurisdictions.. ." GEORGE T. BOGERT, THE LAW
OF TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES § 222 (2d ed. revised 1992). Competition for trust busi-
ness spurs the spread of spendthrift provisions. A document used by the Wil-
mington Trust Company to solicit business in Georgia pointed out that Delaware
recognized the validity of spendthrift trusts while their status in Georgia was un-
certain. Helme & Saunders, "Delaware: An Attractive Home for Trusts," Febru-
ary 4, 1988. The Georgia Trust Law Revision Committee, for which the author
served as the Reporter, cited the Helme & Saunders report to the General As-
sembly in proposing the Georgia Trust Act of 1991, which was enacted on July 1,
1991, and which recognizes the validity of spendthrift provisions. GA. CODE ANN.
§ 53-12-28 (Michie Supp. 1992). See also Bushman, supra note 1, at 307.
18. See, e.g., Shelley v. Shelley, 354 P.2d 282 (Or. 1960).
19. See infra notes 76-100 and accompanying text.
20. In proposing a statutory solution, I echo to some extent the position of Erwin
Griswold. "Since the question is purely one of policy its solution is more appro-
priately a function of the legislature than of the courts." GRISWOLD TREATISE,
supra note 12, at 639. But, quite appropriately at the time, he equivocated:
I~t is not at all clear that resort to legislation is necessary in states where
spendthrift trusts rest only on judicial decisions.... There is no reason
why the courts should not themselves mould the spendthrift trust, and
limit its effectiveness so as to eliminate the abuses which unquestionably
accompany it in its unrestrained form.
Id. at 641-42. While his optimism was justified 45 years ago, it no longer is.
21. For a discussion of the economic impact of high transaction costs, see R. H. Coase,
"The Institutional Structure of Production," Nobel Prize Lecture delivered Dec.
9, 1991 in Stockholm, Sweden, p. 7.
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as to uniformly separate just claims from unjust claims. Given the
virtually universal recognition of spendthrift provisions, the best solu-
tion treats all enforceable claims equally and permits them to be satis-
fied in a manner that does not jeopardize the existence of the trust, or,
in most cases, the fulfillment of its purpose.22
II. RESTRAINTS ON THE ALIENATION OF INTERESTS
IN TRUST
An express trust arises when a settlor puts property (the corpus of
the trust) in the hands of a trustee for the benefit of a beneficiary.
The trustee is given legal title, and the beneficiary is given equitable
title. If we assume one of the simplest and most common arrange-
ments, we may postulate a trust corpus comprised of income produc-
ing investments. We may also assume that the settlor has directed the
trustee to pay the income to the settlor's children, and upon the death
of the last child, to divide the remainder among the grandchildren or
their surviving issue.23
The parent who makes such an arrangement does so with the hope
that the plan will endure. Disruption may occur, though. What if a
child or a grandchild incurs an enormous liability? May the creditor
satisfy its claim out of the trust income or assets? Might that result in
the children and grandchildren being left economically unprotected?
The parent/settlor who wants to avoid this possibility has several op-
tions. Prime among them is a spendthrift provision. Alternatives in-
clude protective provisions and discretionary and support trusts. All
have one thing in common: they act to restrain the beneficiary from
effectively alienating any interest in the trust. Spendthrift provisions
directly restrain the beneficiary, while protective, discretionary and
support trusts limit the assets in which the beneficiary has an interest.
22. Griswold proposed a model statute which was adopted in Louisiana and
Oklahoma. GRISWOLD TREATISE, supra note 12, at 647 n.1. While in the first in-
stance the model statute recognizes the validity and enforceability of spendthrift
provisions, it goes on to leave them vulnerable to complete avoidance. Any credi-
tor can attach income in excess of $5,000 per annum, or 10% of income in excess
of $12.00 per week. In addition, as to certain enumerated creditors, "the court
shall have power to make such order directing the payment of income to such
creditor... as shall be just under the circumstances." Id. at 648. Finally, the
spendthrift provision is not enforceable with respect to the right "to receive the
principal of the trust or any part of it, presently or in the future .. " Id. at 649.
Proponents of spendthrift provisions could well argue that the proposal gives
with one hand and takes away with the other.
23. This arrangement assumes the settlor is constrained by the common law rule
against perpetuities. Under the UNIFORM STATUTORY RULE AGAINST PERPETU-
rrIES, 8A U.L.A. 80 (Supp. 1987), a settlor wishing to extend the duration of the
trust would draft it to take advantage of the 90 year period in gross. See Jesse
Dukeminier, The Uniform Statutory Rule Against Perpetuities: Ninety Years in
Limbo, 34 UCLA L. REV. 1023 (1987).
1993]
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A. Spendthrift Provisions
A spendthrift provision prohibits the beneficiary from voluntarily
or involuntarily transferring her interest in the trust.24 It restrains
the power of the beneficiary to alienate the beneficial interest, and at
the same time directs the trustee to continue distributions to the bene-
ficiary notwithstanding any attempted alienation.25 The following
suggested language appears in a corporate trustee's form book:
The interest of any beneficiary in any trust created under this Will shall not
be transferred, assigned or conveyed and shall not be subject to the claims of
any creditors of such beneficiary, and the Trustee shall continue distributing
trust property directly to or for the benefit of such beneficiary as provided for
herein notwithstanding any transfer, assignment or conveyance, or action by
creditors.
2 6
Arguments for and against the validity of such a provision will be
discussed in section III, infra. Suffice it to say that while the propo-
nents have won the day for the most part in this country, English
courts rejected the concept.27
Predictably, England has not denied the owner of property who
places it in trust the power to control its disposition. Rather, English
courts permit protective provisions. A protective provision allows the
settlor to provide that a voluntary or involuntary alienation (i.e., an
attempted transfer by the beneficiary or an attempted attachment by
creditors of the beneficiary) terminates the interest of the benefici-
ary.2 8 English law also allows the termination of one trust to trigger
the creation of a second, discretionary trust, which may include the
original beneficiary. 2 9
24. I use the term "spendthrift provision" as opposed to "spendthrift trust" because
the fact that a trust includes a spendthrift clause does not necessarily render the
entire trust a spendthrift trust. The clause might, for example, affect the interest
of only one of several beneficiaries.
25. A spendthrift provision only controls the interest while it is held by the trustee.
Once the property reaches the beneficiary, it is subject to the full panoply of cred-
itors' remedies against assets of the debtor. Kelly v. Kelly, 79 P.2d 1059, 1063
(Cal. 1938); Moffat v. Lynch, 642 S.W.2d 624 (Mo. 1982)(en banc)(a contract bind-
ing a beneficiary to pay over a portion of income received from a spendthrift trust
after receipt is enforceable); Griswold, Reaching the Interest, supra note 12, at 84;
John P. Ludington, Annotation, Validity and Construction of Beneficiary's Ar-
rangement for Payment to Another, As They Become Due, of Sums Due Under
Spendthrift Trusts, 83 A.L.R.3d 1142 (1978); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS
§ 152 cmt. j (1959).
26. Wills and Trusts: Suggested Forms. Trust Company Banks in Georgia, 1983. For
other examples, see Huff, supra note 14, at 1202.5.
27. Younghusband v. Gisborne, 63 Eng. Rep. 473 (1844); Green v. Spicer, 39 Eng. Rep.
153 (1830); Brandon v. Robinson, 34 Eng. Rep. 379 (1811). See also Bushman,
supra note 1; IIA WILUAm F. FRATCHER, SCOTT ON TRUSTS 85-86 (4th ed. 1987).
28. GEORGE T. BOGERT, TRUSTS 164-65 (6th ed. 1987).
29. Trustee Act, 1925, 15 & 16 Geo. 5, Ch. 19, § 33 (Eng.).
[Vol. 72:179
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B. Protective, Discretionary and Support Provisions as Alternatives
The major problem with a spendthrift provision is that it might not
be honored. Some jurisdictions have refused to approve spendthrift
provisions on policy grounds.30 Even if judicial decisions indicate that
spendthrift provisions are valid, further decisions may create excep-
tions that limit the protection afforded to the income and assets of the
trust on policy grounds.3 ' Likewise, a statute approving spendthrift
provisions may be subject to the interpretation that it is not meant to
bar certain claims.32 When the validity of spendthrift provisions is liti-
gated, the claimant who wins the sympathy of the court may win the
lawsuit.3 3
If the settlor is primarily concerned with protecting the income
and corpus of the trust from creditors of beneficiaries, a protective
provision offers a highly effective alternative to a spendthrift provi-
sion. Protective provisions insulate the trust by terminating the inter-
est of the beneficiary.3 4 The settlor who uses a protective provision
simply makes a conditional gift. When the condition is breached, the
gift terminates. Many settlors, however, are presumably as interested
in protecting the beneficiary as in protecting the trust. If the major
purpose of the trust is to provide guaranteed lifetime support to a ben-
eficiary, the protective provision is unsatisfactory.
A protective provision need not entirely terminate the interest of
the beneficiary. It may, as in England, terminate the beneficiary's
30. Huff, supra note 14, at 1205.3.
31. Id. at § 1206.1.
32. ERISA offers a prime example of this. Although ERISA when first enacted con-
tained a blanket anti-alienation provision with no express alimony or child sup-
port exception, most courts faced with this issue found that one existed. Mary F.
Radford, Implied Exceptions to the ERISA Prohibitions Against the Forfeiture
and Alienation of Retirement Plan Interests, 1990 UTAH L. REv. 685, 722-23; Jef-
frey G. Sherman, Spendthrift Trusts and Employee Pensions: The Problem of
Creditors' Rights, 55 IND. L.J. 247, 272-73 (1980). See In Re Rosenberg, 199 N.E.
206 (N.Y. 1935), cert denied, 298 U.S. 669 (1936)(dicta regarding claims for unpaid
state taxes); Thomas W. Read, Spendthrift Trusts in Washington-The Statutory
Restraint Upon Involuntary Alienation, 58 WASH. L. REV. 831, 846-49 (1983).
33. See, eg., Shelley v. Shelley, 354 P.2d 282 (Or. 1960). Creditors no doubt mount the
most prevalent assaults on spendthrift provisions. However, other problems may
arise, and in some circumstances the beneficiary finds the provision too restric-
tive. Changed circumstances may make maintenance of a small trust uneconomi-
cal. A spendthrift provision will ordinarily bar termination of the trust by
consent of the beneficiaries after the settlor has died. See GRISWOLD TREATISE,
supra note 12, 3527 at 609. Returning to our parent/child trust, one of several
children who are income beneficiaries may become handicapped; the others may
be economically secure and may wish to assign their interest in order to increase
the interest to the sibling and to avoid income tax on themselves. A spendthrift
clause bars a valid assignment. Id. at § 304.
34. James Rossiter, The Case for Protective Trusts: A Response to the Recommenda-
tions of the Ontario Law Reform Commission, 7 EST. & Ta. Q. 229 (1986).
1993]
NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW
right to income, while at the same time giving the trustee discretion-
ary power to distribute income to the beneficiary. Put more simply, a
protective provision may turn the trust into a discretionary trust with
respect to the beneficiary at issue.
The spendthrift provision insulates the asset even though it be-
longs to the beneficiary. The protective provision terminates the in-
terest of the beneficiary. The discretionary trust, conversely, creates
no interest in the beneficiary. The creditor of a beneficiary can only
reach the property of that beneficiary. Where the beneficiary has no
right to the trust income or corpus, neither, a fortiori, does a creditor
of the beneficiary. Again, however, the beneficiary is unprotected. If
the trustee who holds a discretionary power to distribute income de-
cides not to distribute to a beneficiary, that beneficiary has no remedy
and no right to compel a distribution. It is, after all, the beneficiary's
inability to reach the income or assets of the trust that renders the
beneficiary's creditor unable to do so as well.35
Similarly, a support trust that directs the trustee to distribute in-
come to the beneficiary as necessary for support is inaccessible to cred-
itors of the beneficiaries, unless the creditors supplied the
necessaries.3 6 However, the beneficiary will be relegated to such dis-
tributions as are necessary for support, and the settlor may wish to
guarantee more.
III. THE CONTOURS OF THE DEBATE
Nothing, it seems, works quite like the magic of a spendthrift pro-
vision. Nothing else allows the settlor to determine exactly how much
the beneficiary shall receive, to direct the trustee to distribute that
amount to the beneficiary, and to direct the trustee to ignore all claim-
ants, even judgment creditors. Nothing else allows a beneficiary to
enjoy a stream of income no matter how impecuniously he has be-
haved, while foreclosing any attachment or levy on the interest in
trust. Thus, spendthrift provisions enjoy increasing popularity, and
engender increasing controversy.
A. Arguments Pro and Con: Proponents of Spendthrift Provisions v. The
Loyal Opposition
1. Dicta as Historical Imperative
When Nichols v. Eaton37 reached the United States Supreme Court
in 1875, American courts seemed committed to the venerable English
common law rule invalidating spendthrift provisions.38 The case did
35. See, e.g., State v. Jackson, 822 P.2d 1033, 1036-37 (Kan. 1991).
36. See Estate of Dodge v. Scott, 281 N.W.2d 447 (Iowa 1979).
37. 91 U.S. 716 (1875).
38. Bushman, supra note 1, at 306.
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not, on its facts, implicate that rule because no spendthrift provision
was involved. Justice Miller, however, seized the occasion to offer an
extended dictum which even the disapproving John Chipman Gray
characterized as elaborate, strong, and the product of a man of intel-
lectual force.3 9
The case involved assets held in a trust established by the will of
Sarah Eaton. Sarah Eaton's will made her four children the income
beneficiaries of a protective trust; should a son's interest terminate be-
cause of the attempted alienation or disposition of the income, includ-
ing the son's insolvency or bankruptcy, that son's share of the income
would become payable to his wife and children. If there were no
spouse or children the income accumulated, provided that following
the termination of a son's right to income the trustee had the discre-
tion to distribute all or any part of that income to the son and/or his
wife and children.40
After Sarah Eaton's death one of her sons, Amasa, became insol-
vent. Amasa, who was unmarried, made a general assignment of all
his property for the benefit of his creditors to Charles A. Nichols.
Subsequently, Nichols was appointed his assignee in bankruptcy.
Nichols brought suit against the executors and trustees of Sarah Ea-
ton's will and trust to recover the income which Amasa had forfeited,
and which was now payable to him at the discretion of the trustees, for
the benefit of Amasa's creditors.
41
With reference to the termination of Amasa's interest, Sarah Ea-
ton's will had been carefully drafted to fall within the English rule on
protective trusts:
Taking for our guide the cases decided in the English courts, the doctrine of
the case of Brandon v. Robinson seems to be pretty well established. It is
equally well settled that a devise of the income of property, to cease on the
insolvency or bankruptcy of the devisee, is good, and that the limitation is
valid 42
In converting the trust to a discretionary trust of which Amasa was a
potential beneficiary, however, she went a step further.43 Nichols ar-
gued that the discretionary provisions were merely a sham, a way to
"evade the policy of the law already mentioned; that the discretion
vested in the trustees is equivalent to a direction, and that it was well
known it would be exercised in favor of the bankrupt."44 The Court
disagreed, and applied the standard rule for discretionary trusts.
39. Gray, supra note 10, at v.
40. Nichols v. Eaton, 91 U.S. 716, 717-19 (1875).
41. Amasa, along with his half-brother George Ruggles and one William Bailey, was
both an executor and a trustee.
42. Nichols v. Eaton, 91 U.S. 716, 722 (1875).
43. This is, however, precisely the scheme presently authorized by the English
Trustee Act. See supra notes 28-29.
44. Nichols v. Eaton, 91 U.S. 716, 723 (1875). His argument would seem to be but-
1993]
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Under the instrument, the trustees were given absolute discretion;
Amasa could not in fact compel its exercise in his favor. Therefore, he
had no interest his creditors could reach.45
Having decided the case, Justice Miller, who wrote for a unani-
mous Court, went on in dicta to lay the foundation for the approval of
spendthrift trusts in the United States. He noted that while the Court
had adopted the English Chancery Courts' rule on protective trusts, it
did not agree with that court's invalidation of spendthrift provisions as
impermissible restraints on alienation. Characterizing the rule as "in-
grafted upon the common law for the benefit of creditors, and... com-
paratively of modern origin,"46 he articulated three rationales for
approving spendthrift provisions. First, in every state, debtors were
empowered by statute to exempt some portion of their property from
creditors' claims; spendthrift trust provisions simply worked an analo-
gous exemption which in no way violated public policy. Second, a
creditor relies at her own risk on income or assets which, due to the
recordation of wills and testamentary trusts, she is on notice are not
available to satisfy her claims. Finally, the owner of property as an
incident of ownership should be able to attach conditions for the pro-
tection of a donee.47
Gray responded by authoring his classic treatise, Restraints on the
Alienation of Property.48 He sought to establish that "[t]he current of
law has for centuries been in favor of removing old restraints on alien-
ation," and that this was especially true with reference to "compelling
a debtor to apply to his debts all property which he could use for him-
self or give at his pleasure to others."49
2. Should Spendthrift Provisions Be Treated as Invalid
Restraints on Alienation?
The argument relying on the general prohibition of restraints on
alienation has not aged well, at least with regard to trusts.5 0 Two of
the significant evils of restraints on alienation-perpetuating the dead
hand's control of property and removing property interests from the
stream of commerce-are substantially ameliorated by the rise of the
modern trust in which the trustee has virtually all the power over the
tressed by Amasa's status as a co-trustee, see supra note 41, but the Court's analy-
sis made no reference to that fact.
45. Id. at 724-25.
46. Id. at 725.
47. Id. at 726-27.
48. Gray, supra note 5.
49. Id. at § 4, p. 2.
50. Restraints on the alienation of legal title, as opposed to the equitable title held by
a beneficiary, continue to be disfavored and are generally invalid. IIA FRATCHER,
supra note 27, at 130-32; Bogert, supra note 28, at 358-69.
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legal title to the property that an owner would have.51 Passive trust-
ees, who might well lack the power to sell or even lease trust property,
were once the rule.52 Now they are archaic exceptions. Trustee's
powers are still held somewhat in check, though. While the trustee
typically has the power to buy or sell, invest or reinvest trust property,
the trustee must ordinarily act with a degree of caution not incumbent
on an absolute owner.53 Put simply, trust capital is not risk capital.
Nonetheless, the alienability of the legal title of most property held
in trust supports Justice Miller's position. Yet Justice Miller does not
allude to alienability, and at the time he wrote it may well have been
common for trustees to have only limited powers to sell. What argu-
ment, or policy, obvious at the turn of the century, drove the enthusi-
astic embrace of the concept of spendthrift provisions?
Viewing spendthrift provisions from the perspective of the law's
general antipathy to restraints against alienation helps clarify why
spendthrift provisions were accepted in American courts. The disal-
lowance of restraints against alienation has its roots in the ancient
rules of property law relating to seisin. If one has a fee interest, one
must have the entire bundle of rights that comprise the interest, in-
cluding the power to alienate it. Therefore, any restriction on a fee is
"repugnant" to the grant of the fee and void.54
Notwithstanding this theoretical concept, as early as the 12th cen-
tury, English law imposed considerable restraints on property. As
early as the 13th century, however, English law began to remove those
restraints.5 5 Gray identifies the forces in favor of restraints on aliena-
tion as "[f]amily and ecclesiastical pride and natural dishonesty."56
Gray should have added governmental interests. As he points out,
"[t]he abolition [in 1660] of military tenures and of fines to the Crown
did away with the last restraints upon the transfer of estates in fee
simple....
Restraints on alienation tend to preserve the status quo by freezing
51. See UNIFoRM TRUSTEES' PoWERs ACT, 7B U.L.A. 753 (1985).
52. William F. Fratcher, Trustees'Powers Legislation, 37 N.Y.U. L. REv. 627 (1962); I
FRATCHER, supra note 27, at 186.
53. See Jeffrey N. Gordon, The Puzzling Persistence of the Constrained Prudent Man
Rule, 62 N.Y.U. L. REv. 52 (1987). Many of Professor Gordon's concerns are ad-
dressed by the revised Restatement prudent investor rule. RESTATEMENT
(THIRD) OF TRUSTs, § 227 (1992).
54. Some commentators identify the disallowance of restraints against alienation as
"the major defining characteristic of a liberal commercial society as opposed to a
feudal one." Alexander, supra note 1, at 1191. Alexander goes on to explain:
"Along with liberty of contract, free alienation is one of the keystones of the twin
policies of promoting individual autonomy and free exchange in competitive mar-
kets." Id.
55. GRAY, supra note 5, at 2-3.
56. Id. at 2.
57. Id. at 3.
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the situation. They are consistent with the requisites of a society with
an economy completely controlled, and largely owned, by church and
state. Restraints are inconsistent with an entrepreneurial, free mar-
ket society.58 Commerce cannot thrive if the critical property cannot
be transferred. The invalidation of restraints in general was essential
to the economic development of England and the United States.
What, then, accounts for the American approval of a classic re-
straint on alienation, the spendthrift provision? I would submit that
the very interests which must invalidate restraints in order to thrive
suddenly find that this particular restraint suits their personal inter-
ests quite nicely. That is, the successful entrepreneur utilizes the free
market concept to amass a fortune. Once he has amassed his fortune,
the protection provided by a restraint on alienation suddenly becomes
appealing.59
Costigan, who castigated Gray for his reaction to Nichols v. Ea-
ton,60 defended the concept somewhat smugly:
When one thinks of the boost to plutocracy given to the possessors of property
by those devices of practical exemption from full legal and financial responsi-
bility for business venture failures, known as limited partnerships and corpo-
rations... he has to smile at the great to-do made over trusts designed by a
trustor to give [an income] to a favored cestui que trust, for a lifetime or less,
out of the trustor's property, to which the cestui's creditors in no way
contributed .... 
6 1
The disingenuousness of this position has resulted in one virtually
universal exception. A settlor cannot obtain this protection for her-
self. "A man cannot put his own property beyond the reach of credi-
tors and at the same time reserve substantial interest in it or control
over it."62 As early as 1930, Dean Griswold observed, "The cases are
uniform in holding that.., a person cannot create a spendthrift trust
58. See Alexander, supra note 1.
59. See Friedman, supra note 4, at 572:
Validation of the spendthrift trust was primarily a response to the
spread of the dynastic trust. The dynastic trust, as we have seen, must be
secure from destructive market conditions; hence the need for flexibility
in investment, But it must also be secure from destruction at the hands
of particular beneficiaries and this need has been met by the spendthrift
trust.
Cf. Alexander, supra note 1, at 1193 n.10.
Gray identified the general acceptance of spendthrift provisions as a reaction
against "doctrines of laissez faire, of sacredness of contract, and of individual lib-
erty," GRAY, supra note 10, at viii, and an approval of "that spirit... of paternal-
ism, which is the fundamental essence alike of spendthrift trusts and of
socialism." Id. at ix.
60. Costigan, supra note 7, at 471-72.
61. Id. at 472. Yet Costigan, by focusing on the need of the beneficiary as legitimizing
spendthrift provisions, sharply circumscribes the permissible reach of the protec-
tion. If "need" be the justification, then only a "reasonable amount of income"
can be justified. See supra notes 50-52 and accompanying text.
62. Griswold, Spendthrift Trusts, supra note 12, at 208.
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for himself which shall be effective against the rights of his subse-
quent creditors." 63
In his sometimes biting response to John Chipman Gray, George
Costigan points out that while the common law is replete with denun-
ciations of restraints on alienation, even Gray recognized that common
law courts had simultaneously approved of certain restraints.64 Thus,
Costigan argues, no universal rule invalidating restraints on alienation
exists, and "whether restraints on alienation, voluntary or involun-
tary, or both, shall be permitted, are purely questions of humanity and
of wise public policy."65 Wise policy, he maintains, while validating
spendthrift trust provisions to a great extent, would focus on "the
need of the beneficiary, and not the prideful and lordly disposition of
the donor .... "66 In other words, even Costigan would impose a needs
test and would not extend protection to unchecked amounts of in-
come. Costigan does not, therefore, address the policy questions Gray
raises. Furthermore, while a needs test would destroy much of the
utility of the spendthrift provision to the rich and answer the criticism
that one should not enjoy a luxurious income while not meeting one's
obligations, a needs test would also impose intolerable transaction
costs by requiring the claimant to establish that the beneficiary was
not needy enough to qualify for a public policy exception. Finally, a
needs test will inevitably force courts of equity to fashion inequitable
remedies. The beneficiary who lives a life reflecting high social status
will need more income to meet his basic expenses than will the benefi-
ciary of more modest means. As Gray said of the New York "station
in life" rule,
63. Id. at 205. Few voices have ever been raised in support of the proposition that a
person should be able to immunize her own property from the reach of her credi-
tors. But see A Rationale for the Spendthrift Trust, 64 CoLuM. L. REV. 1323, 1332
(1964)("Something is unquestionably wrong, however, when a person is pre-
vented from achieving for himself the same degree of future security that a gen-
erous benefactor could bestow upon him.")
Griswold himself, somewhat surprisingly, is among them. He concluded his
article with the somewhat enigmatic comment: "If spendthrift trusts are to be
tolerated at all, we may well question the soundness of a rule which allows a man
to hold the bounty of others free from the claim of his creditors, but denies the
same immunity to his interest in property which he has accumulated by his own
effort." Griswold, Spendthrift Trusts, supra note 12, at 222. By observing this
hole in logic he seemed to be tweaking the nose of proponents. In his treatise,
however, he proposed that it be closed. GRIswoLD TREATISE, supra note 12, at
644-45.
Both the Columbia Law Review commentator and Griswold are disconcerted
by the illogical rule. I would suggest that the problem is caused not by the re-
striction-which is both logically sound and an expression of compelling public
policy-but by the recognition of spendthrift provisions in the first place.
64. See Costigan, supra note 7, at 480-81.
65. Id.
66. Id. at 484.
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To say that whatever money is given to a man cannot be taken by his credi-
tors is bad enough; at any rate, however, it is law for the rich and poor alike;
but to say that from a sum which creditors can reach one man, who has lived
simply and plainly, can deduct but a small sum, while a large sum may be
deducted by another man because he is "of high social standing," or because
"his associations are chiefly with men of leisure," or because he "is connected
with a number of clubs," is to descend to a depth of as shameless snobbishness
as any into which the justice of a country was ever plunged.
6 7
Finally, Justice Miller relied in large part on exemption statutes to
establish that public policy supports restraints on alienation. As one
commentator notes, however, exemption statutes may be thoroughly
distinguished from spendthrift provisions:
Exemption laws seek to strengthen the integrity of the debtor by keeping him
from absolute poverty, to benefit the community by keeping him off the wel-
fare rolls and to protect the debtor's family from starvation, while still en-
abling the maximum payment to the creditors. Spendthrift trusts, on the
other hand, permit children of rich men to live in debt and luxury at the same
time, while the claims of their creditors remain unsatisfied.
68
3. The Notice Argument
Justice Miller's second rationale, the notice argument, stands on
both the shakiest of footings and the firmest of foundations. He ob-
served that creditors of the beneficiary of a spendthrift trust had little
to complain of because testamentary trusts, as part of probated wills,
are recorded public documents. Anyone who extends credit despite
being on notice that the debtor's income is insulated by a spendthrift
provision acts at her own risk:
When ... it appears by the record of a will that the devisee holds this life-
estate or income, dividends, or rents of real or personal property, payable to
him alone, to the exclusion of the alienee or creditor, the latter knows, that, in
creating a debt with such person, he has no right to look to that income as a
means of discharging it. He is neither misled nor defrauded when the object
of the testator is carried out by excluding him from any benefit of such a
devise.
6 9
This argument fails on two grounds. First, while testamentary
trusts are public records, inter vivos trusts are not; the point simply
does not apply to a significant number of trusts. Second, the creditor
did not necessarily "recklessly" extend credit. The creditor might
hold a tort judgment, or a claim for child support or unpaid taxes.70
With reference to contract creditors, however, the spirit of Justice
Miller's observation continues to prevail. Contract claimants are un-
likely to obtain satisfaction from assets protected by a spendthrift pro-
67. GRAY, supra note 10, at xi.
68. Bushman, supra note 1, at 312.
69. Nichols v. Eaton, 91 U.S. 716, 726 (1875).
70. Nichols v. Eaton involved contract creditors of the beneficiary of a testamentary
trust; Justice Miller's dictum is not limited to those facts precisely because it is
dictum.
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vision. This result turns not on the argument that the creditor is on
constructive notice of the provisions of a testamentary trust, but
rather on the argument that the creditor should identify security
before extending creit.71 The creditor who relies on apparent afflu-
ence without determining its source does so at his own risk. This posi-
tion, despite its appeal, has two flaws. First, it increases initial
transaction costs in all extensions of credit in order to control rela-
tively few situations. Second, by making the determination of
whether a claim is entitled to satisfaction turn on whether it is a con-
tract claim, transaction costs are increased by adding a layer of com-
plexity. Claimants forced into litigation will classify claims as
something other than contract claims, e.g., as the tort of negligent
breach of contract.
7 2
4. The Incident of Ownership Argument
Justice Miller's final argument continues to provoke enthusiastic
agreement and astonished disagreement. Harking to the American
tradition recognizing private property, with its assumption that the
owner of property may do with it as he will, Justice Miller waxed both
eloquent and sentimental:
Nor do we see any reason, in the recognized nature and tenure of property
and its transfer by will, why a testator who gives ... may not attach to that gift
the incident of continued use, of uninterrupted benefit of the gift, during the
life of the donee. Why a parent, or one who loves another, and wishes to use
his own property in securing the object of his affection, as far as property can
do it, from the ills of life, the vicissitudes of fortune, and even his own improv-
idence, or incapacity for self-protection, should not be permitted to do so, is
not readily perceived.
7 3
Simply stated, Justice Miller's position seems to be, "It's the set-
tlor's property; the settlor can do as he wishes with it." The response
is obvious: it is not the settlor's property; rather, it is the beneficiary's
property. When questions about the enforceability of spendthrift pro-
visions arise, the property held in trust and at issue "belongs" to the
beneficiary. Otherwise, the beneficiary's creditor has no basis for a
claim against the trust. To say it is the settlor's property both begs the
question and confuses the analysis. It once was the settlor's property,
but it no longer is. That argument, therefore, reduces itself to the fun-
71. IIA FRATCHER, supra note 27, § 157.5, at 220.
72. See, e.g., Sam Finley, Inc. v. Barnes, 275 S.E.2d 380 (Ga. Ct. App. 1980)(quoting
Foster Wheeler Corp. v. Georgia Power Co., 230 S.E.2d 494 (Ga. Ct. App.
1976)("Barnes initially filed suit alleging both breach of contract and negligence
in the performance of the contract... .'We accept as a fundamental legal precept
that a single act or course of conduct may constitute either a breach of contract or
an independent tort.' "). See also East River Steamship Corp. v. Transamerica
Delaval, Inc., 476 U.S. 858, 866-75 (1986).
73. Nichols v. Eaton, 91 U.S. 716, 727 (1875)(emphasis added, except for "gives,"
which was italicized in the original).
1993]
NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW
damental question of whether the law should allow a person who once
owned property to convey it subject to restraints on its alienation.74
The law's answer, for the most part, is no. With respect to spendthrift
provisions, however, the answer is generally yes.75 Whether this is
wise remains highly debatable. No one has answered Gray's funda-
mental objection that the law should not allow a person to enjoy a
stream of income, however lavish, that is not subject to claims for just
debts.
B. Where the Dust Has Settled
1. Claimants Likely to Prevail-the Restatement List
The overwhelming acceptance of the validity of spendthrift provi-
sions in principle has been ameliorated in most jurisdictions by a con-
comitant recognition of exceptions. Certain creditors may present
such compelling claims that public policy demands recognition. The
Restatement lists the claims typically recognized:
Although a trust is a spendthrift trust or a trust for support, the interest of the
beneficiary can be reached in satisfaction of an enforceable claim against the
beneficiary,
(a) by the wife or child of the beneficiary for support, or by the wife for
alimony;
(b) for necessary services rendered to the beneficiary or necessary sup-
plies furnished to him;
(c) for services rendered and materials furnished which preserve or ben-
efit the interest of the beneficiary;
(d) by the United States or a State to satisfy a claim against the
beneficiary.
7 6
In addition, "The interest of the beneficiary of a spendthrift trust...
may be reached in cases others than those herein enumerated, if con-
siderations of public policy so require."77
74. One commentator describes this issue as presenting a "basic paradox at the core
of liberal property law." Alexander, supra note 1, at 1189. Alexander maintains
that "Contemporary legal thought lacks any conception of 'social welfare' that
coherently rationalizes the extant body of doctrines regulating individual power
to impose restraints.... It accedes to social control over the right of disposition in
order to further social interests without admitting that it has thereby abandoned
the individualized power of disposition." Id. at 1263. His quarrel, it seems, is not
with the result, ie., some restraints on the right of disposition are valid, but
rather with the theoretical inconsistencies of those who have so coficluded. He
suggests that "[w]e might enrich legal doctrine by treating no single actor's intent
as capable of trumping the intentions of all other actors with respect to the dispo-
sition of a given asset." Id. at 1266. I find it satisfactory to recognize that policy
reasons compel certain limitations on the right of unfettered disposition, see GRIS-
WOLD TREATISE, supra note 12, § 554-55, and I would conclude that policy reasons
mandate disallowing spendthrift provisions.
75. See supra, note 14.
76. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 157 (1959).
77. Id. at Cmt. a.
[Vol. 72:179
SPENDTHRIFT TRUSTS
The author of a 1984 survey of spendthrift provisions concluded
that more than 30 states had, by case law, recognized an exception for
child support claimants.78 Some jurisdictions recognize this exception
by statute.79 Alimony claimants are also likely to prevail, although
somewhat less likely than child support claimants.80
Claims for necessaries present one of the conundrums of this area
of the law. While there has been limited litigation of this issue, most
courts agree that those who provide necessaries to the beneficiary can
recover from the assets of the trust, a spendthrift provision notwith-
standing.S1 The commentators are virtually unanimous.8 2 Courts and
commentators reason that allowing claimants for necessaries to re-
cover is consistent with the purpose of the trust, which is presumably
to provide for the beneficiary.
8 3
For those who oppose spendthrift provisions on principle, however,
the claimant for necessities presents a peculiar problem. Public policy
surely must recognize as meritorious the interest of a settlor in provid-
ing permanent economic protection to a disabled beneficiary. Yet the
disabled beneficiary is especially likely to incur high expenses for
necessaries such as living expenses in a personal care home and medi-
cal expenses. To complicate the matter, the claimant may be both a
provider of necessaries and a governmental entity.8 4 It is ironic that
the one class of beneficiaries for whom a strong policy argument can
be made supporting the validity of spendthrift provisions in its favor-
the disabled beneficiary-is likely to incur substantial claims from two
classes of creditors who are likely to prevail when they assert claims
against the trust.
78. Huff, supra note 14, at 1206.3.
79. See, e.g., GA. CODE. ANN. § 53-12-28(c)(5)(Michie Supp. 1992). Griswold included
child support as an exception in the model statute he first proposed in 1936. GRIs-
WOLD TREATISE (1st ed.), supra note 12, at 478.
80. Huff, supra note 14, at 1206.4. Again, some statutes provide exceptions for ali-
mony claims, see, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 53-12-28(c)(4)(Michie Supp. 1992), as did
Griswold in his proposal. GRISWOLD TREATISE, supra note 12.
81. See, e-g., American Sec. and Trust Co. v. Utley, 382 F.2d 451 (D.C. Cir. 1967);
Lackmann v. Department of Mental Hygiene, 320 P.2d 186 (Cal. Ct. App. 1958);
Lang v. Commonwealth Dep't of Pub. Welfare, 528 A.2d 1335 (Pa. 1987); Erickson
v. Bank of Cal., 643 P.2d 670 (Wash. 1982). See also Huff, supra note 14, at
1206.5; Wicker, supra note 14, at 6.
82. See, e.g., IIA FRATCHER, supra note 27, at 201-08; GEORGE G. BOGERT & GEORGE T.
BOGERT, TRusTs AND TRUSTEES, 456 (2d ed. 1979)(hereinafter "BOGERT & Bo-
GERT"). Griswold recommended this exception in his proposed Model Act, see
GRIsWOLD TREATISE, supra note 12, at 648 (Model Act § 2(c)(2)).
83. IIA FRATCHER, supra note 27, at 201-02; BOGERT & BOGERT, supra note 82, at 461;
GRISWOLD TREATISE, supra note 12, at 648 (Model Act § 2(c)(2)).
84. See, e.g., Lackmann v. Department of Mental Hygiene, 320 P.2d 186 (Cal. Ct. App.
1958); Department of Mental Health and Developmental Disabilities v. First Nat'l
Bank, 432 N.E.2d 1086 (Ill. App. Ct. 1982); Lang v. Commonwealth Dep't of Pub.
Welfare, 528 A.2d 1335 (Pa. 1987).
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Although estate planning for disabled beneficiaries is beyond the
scope of this article, it bears mentioning that families confronted with
the problem may combine a spendthrift provision with a discretionary
trust. The beneficiary can then argue that even though the claimant
can prevail against the spendthrift provision, whether relying on the
status of a provider of necessaries or of a governmental entity, the
claimant can only reach the beneficiary's interest in the trust. If the
trust is truly discretionary then absent an abuse of discretion,8 5
neither the beneficiary nor a creditor of the beneficiary may compel
distribution.8 6 Some estate planners recommend using a spendthrift
provision in combination with a supplemental needs trust, but
whether such a plan will effectively block claimants for necessaries is
unclear in most jurisdictions.8 7
The Restatement's third exception is "for services rendered and
materials furnished which preserve or benefit the interest of the bene-
ficiary."88 This exception exists in part because it would be counter-
productive not to recognize it. The exception assures that the
beneficiary's interest in the trust will not be diminished or lost be-
cause the person in a position to protect it declines to do so for fear her
efforts would be uncompensated. Additionally, this exception in-
volves benefits conferred by the claimant; denying recovery would re-
sult in unjust enrichment of the trust.8 9 Recovery for a benefit
85. Compare Department of Mental Health v. Old Kent Bank & Trust Co., 345
N.W.2d 642 (Mich. Ct. App. 1984) with Murphy v. Scott, 281 N.W.2d 447 (Iowa
1979). Where the purpose of the trust is to provide for the beneficiary, a court
may find that failure to pay creditors for necessaries is an abuse of discretion.
Lackmann v. Department of Mental Hygiene, 320 P.2d 186 (Cal. Ct. App. 1958).
86. See Watts v. McKay, 162 P.2d 82 (Kan. 1945), discussed in Secretary of Social and
Rehabilitation Serv. v. Jackson, 822 P.2d 1033, 1036-37 (Kan. 1991); Department of
Mental Health v. Old Kent Bank & Trust Co., 345 N.W.2d 642, 644 (Mich. Ct. App.
1984); RESTATEmENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 155 (1959). Although distribution
cannot be compelled absent an abuse of discretion, quaere whether aft fa. should
lie against any distribution once the trustee decides to make it, but before the
transfer can be completed?
87. Department of Mental Health and Developmental Disabilities v. Phillips, 500
N.E.2d 29 (Ill. 1986).
88. REsTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 157(c)(1959).
89. Id. § 157(c), cmt. d. In Evans & Luptak v. Obolensky, 487 N.W.2d 521 (Mich. Ct.
App. 1992), the plaintiff law firm was retained in connection with the sale of cer-
tain businesses owned by the trust. Although the exact nature of the services was
not clear, the defendant did not contest the allegation that the firm was retained
"to benefit the defendant's interest in the trust." The trial court ruled that the
spendthrift provision barred collection of the claim from the trust. Reversing,
the Court of Appeals held that "[ilt would constitute unjust enrichment if the
trial court were not able to fashion a remedy that allowed the attorneys to be paid
for their services in enhancing the position of the beneficiary." I& at 523.
Whether these plaintiffs were entitled to recover was not resolved, because the
Court of Appeals directed the trial court on remand to address two questions:
1. Must the benefit to the interest of the beneficiary be actual or tangi-
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conferred presents a different issue than recovery from the assets con-
tributed by the settlor. Finally, as the Restatement notes, in many
such cases, recovery could be had on a contract theory: "[T]he person
rendering the services and furnishing the materials would have a
claim against the trustee if he contracted for such services and materi-
als, and the trustee would be entitled to indemnity out of the trust
property."90
The fourth and final exception enumerated by the Restatement is
for claims by the United States or a state. While the federal govern-
ment ordinarily defers to state law on the issue of whether a debtor
holds any property interest, whether that interest is subject to levy on
a federal claim is a question of federal law.9 1 With respect to tax liens,
the answer is both clear and predictable; an otherwise valid spend-
thrift provision will not prevent levy by the Internal Revenue Service
for satisfaction of a tax lien.9 2 In fact, governmental claims in general,
whether state or federal, prevail.93
What of those claims not listed in the Restatement, most notably
tort claims and contract claims? While tort claims are not listed as
recognized exceptions because of the paucity of decisional authority,94
comment "a" addresses them:
The interest of the beneficiary of a spendthrift trust... may be reached in
cases other than those herein enumerated, if considerations of public policy so
require. Thus it is possible that a person who has a claim in tort against the
beneficiary of a spendthrift trust may be able to reach his interest under the
trust.9 5
Notwithstanding early approval of the theory that tort claimants
should be allowed to recover pursuant to a public policy exception,96 a
ble rather than nothing more than good faith efforts? Is it a benefit to
the interest of the beneficiary to have a law firm looking out for her
interests during the period of negotiations for the sale of trust property?
2. Is it enough to look at the unanswered complaint which resulted in a
default judgment or may the trial court look behind the pleadings to de-
termine whether the services actually performed by the law firm meet
the requirements of § 157(c) of the Restatement?
Id-
90. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS, § 157(c) cmt. d (1959).
91. See Howard v. United States, 566 S.W.2d 521, 525 (Tenn. 1978); Aquilino v. United
States, 363 U.S. 509, 513-14 (1960); United States v. Mitchell, 403 U.S. 190, 197
(1971).
92. First Northwestern Trust Co. v. IRS, 622 F.2d 387 (8th Cir. 1980).
93. See IIA FRATCHER, supra note 27, at § 157.4.
94. Id. at § 157.5: "There is little authority on the question whether the interest of
the beneficiary of a spendthrift trust can be reached by persons against whom he
has committed a tort. In the absence of authority it was felt by those who were
responsible for the preparation of the Restatement of Trusts that no categorical
statement could be made on the question (footnote omitted)."
95. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS, § 157 cmt. a (1959).
96. IIA FRATCHER, supra note 27, at § 157.5; BOGERT & BOGERT, supra note 82, at 468;
GRISWOLD TREATISE, supra note 12 at 648, (Model Act § 2(c)(3)).
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recent commentator concluded, "Cases addressing whether tort credi-
tors should be able to reach the beneficial interest in a spendthrift
trust, although scarce, overwhelmingly reject an exception for tort vic-
tims." 9 7 At least two state statutes include tort creditors: the Louisi-
ana statute, which is modeled on the Griswold proposal,9 8 and the
Georgia statute. 99 In the absence of a statute, however, recovery is
uncertain at best.X00
Pity the poor contract creditor. Those commentators who express
sympathy for the tort creditor-after all, one can't check the credit of
the driver of a car about to hit oneself'0o--reserve none for the con-
tract creditor. "It has frequently been suggested that [ordinary con-
tract creditors] have only themselves to blame if they extend credit to
[the beneficiary of a spendthrift trust] without first ascertaining the
amount of his resources that are available for the discharge of his
debts."10 2 Quaere whether the notice argument should be treated as
compelling. x03 How unreasonable is it to rely in extending credit on
the appearance of economic substance? What of the small town
banker, or shop keeper, well aware of the standard of living of a long-
time acquaintance? Is doing business on a handshake something soci-
ety wants to discourage to the extent of denying the creditor any ac-
cess to otherwise unencumbered assets of the debtor?
2. Pensions and Retirement Plans: The Erisa Exception
No discussion of spendthrift provisions is complete without a con-
sideration of the impact of ERISA, the Employee Retirement Income
Security Act of 1974.104 Congress enacted ERISA as part of a compre-
97. Brooks, supra note 1, at 125.
98. Id. at 129. Oklahoma, which also patterned its statute on the Griswold proposal,
omitted tort creditors. Id.
99. GA. CODE ANN. § 53-12-28(c)(1)(Michie Supp. 1992).
100. A recent issue of the California Lawyer included an article describing a lawsuit
by a woman attempting to recover damages resulting from a sexual assault. The
defendant, who is on San Quentin's death row for a murder committed within a
week after the assault, receives at least $300 per month from a trust, established
by his mother, which includes a spendthrift provision. Professor McGovern of
UCLA Law School is quoted as opining that recovery would be inappropriate be-
cause the California legislature enacted an exception for child support, and did
not enact one for tort claimants. Diane Keaton, Breach of Trusts, 10 CAL. LAW. 24
(November 1990). Subsequently, a 1991 California law authorized payment of
"restitution judgments" from distributions to the beneficiary from a spendthrift
trust. CAL. PROB. CODE § 15305.5 (West Supp. 1993).
101. "A man who is about to be knocked down by an automobile has no opportunity to
investigate the credit of the driver of the automobile and has no opportunity to
avoid being injured no matter what the resources of the driver may be." IIA
FRATCHER, supra note 27, at 220.
102. Id at 186.
103. Id.
104. Pub. L. No. 93-406, 88 Stat. 829 (1974).
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hensive plan to safeguard the retirement income of the nation's work-
ers.10 5 In return for submitting to federal regulations, employers who
establish tax qualified ERISA plans gain a number of advantages.
Basically, there are three advantages to tax qualification. First, employers are
able to deduct currently contributions made to the plan even though employ-
ees actually may not receive this deferred compensation until a later time.
Second, the trust to which plan contributions are made is exempt from income
tax. Third, plan participants need not recognize their plan benefits as income
until they actually receive them.
1 0 6
In order to be tax qualified, an ERISA plan must have a spend-
thrift provision. "A trust shall not constitute a qualified trust under
this section unless the plan of which such trust is a part provides that
benefits provided under the plan may not be assigned or alienated."07
The facial clarity of this provision notwithstanding, creditors of bene-
ficiaries of ERISA qualified plans have been predictably aggressive in
seeking to overcome this barrier to recovery from their debtor's inter-
est in the trust.
Alimony and child support creditors have been successful. 08 ER-
ISA, when first enacted, contained a blanket anti-alienation provision
and no alimony or child support exception. Nonetheless, virtually
every court confronting this issue found that an exception existed.109
Congress concurred in this construction of the ERISA anti-alienation
provision when it enacted the Retirement Equity Act of 1984110 and
included an exception for "qualified domestic relations orders."'111
Notwithstanding over a decade of contentious litigation, and the
adoption by the lower courts of a number of "implied exceptions,"1 2 it
now appears that ERISA spendthrift provisions are virtually impreg-
nable. In two recent cases, the Supreme Court decisively resolved two
major issues in favor of the trusts.1 1 3 Even more critically, the Court
105. See Guidry v. Sheet Metal Workers Nat'l Pension Fund, 493 U.S. 365, 371 (1990).
106. Radford, supra note 32, at 691 (footnotes omitted).
107. 26 U.S.C. § 401(a)(13); see also 26 C.F.R. 1.401(a)-13(b)(1)(1992).
108. A Treasury Regulation provides that federal tax claims are not precluded by the
requisite spendthrift provision. Treas. Reg. 1.401(a)-13(b)(2)(1981), codified at 26
C.F.R. 1.401(a)-13 (b)(2)(1992). See Sherman, supra note 32, at 282-83. Quaere
whether the regulation survives Patterson? See infra note 132 and accompanying
text.
109. Rdford, supra note 32, at 722-23; Sherman, supra note 32, at 272-73.
110. Pub. L. 98-397, § 104(a), 98 Stat. 1426, 1433-36 (codified at 29 U.S.C.A.
§ 1056(d)(3)(A)-(N)(Supp. 1992)); Pub. L. 98-397, § 204(a), 98 Stat. 1445 (codified
at 26 U.S.C.A. § 401(a)(Supp. 1992)).
111. ERISA § 206(d)(3), 29 U.S.C. § 1056 (d)(3)(1988); I.R.C. §§ 401(a)(13),
414(p)(1988).
112. See Rdford, supra note 32; Sherman, supra note 32; Ronald I. Kirschbaum, ER-
ISA Spendthrift Rules-It Just Shouldn't Be This Hard, 11 CAMPBELL L. REV. 29
(1988).
113. Patterson v. Shumate, 112 S. Ct. 2242 (1992); Guidry v. Sheet Metal Workers Na-
tional Pension Fund, 493 U.S. 365 (1990).
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staked its position by describing itself as "vigorously [enforcing] ER-
ISA's prohibition on the assignment or alienation of pension benefits,
[and] declining to recognize any implied exceptions to the broad statu-
tory bar."114
In Guidry v. Sheet Metal Workers National Pension Fund,115 Cur-
tis Guidry pled guilty to embezzling funds from the sheet metal work-
ers union of which he served as an officer. Guidry also served as a
trustee for one of three union pension funds from which he was eligi-
ble to receive benefits. While serving his sentence for embezzlement,
Guidry filed suit against two of the plans alleging that they were
wrongfully withholding his benefits. He did not sue the third because
he had reached a settlement with it. The union intervened, joined the
third plan, and obtained a $275,000 judgement against Guidry.116
The union sought to recover on the judgement by imposing a con-
structive trust on Guidry's interests in the plans. The plans contended
that the prohibition on the alienation of benefits in section 206(d)(1) of
ERISA117 barred this remedy. Reading ERISA in pari materia with
the Labor Management Relations Act and the Labor-Management Re-
porting and Disclosure Act of 1959 (LMRDA), the district court con-
cluded that "circumstances where the viability of a union and the
members' pension plans was damaged by the knavery of a union offi-
cial" presented a narrow exception to the ERISA anti-alienation pro-
vision.118 The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit
affirmed.119
The Tenth Circuit was not alone in concluding that criminal mis-
conduct by the employee justified imposition of an equitable remedy
on the employee's interest in the company's pension fund.120 The
Supreme Court disagreed, however. Recognizing that "there may be a
natural distaste for the result we reach here,"12 ' the Court held firm
to the statutory bar on alienation: "[Tihe identification of any excep-
tion should be left to Congress."1 22
One scenario may, however, fit a statutory exception. In Guidry,
the Tenth Circuit relied on section 409(a) of ERISA,123 finding that it
created a statutory exception. That section provides that when a plan
114. Patterson v. Shumate, 112 S. Ct. 2242, 2247 (1992).
115. 493 U.S. 365 (1990).
116. The facts are taken from the opinion of the Supreme Court. Id
117. 29 U.S.C. § 1056 (d)(1).
118. Guidry v. Sheet Metal Workers' Nat'l Pension Fund, 641 F. Supp. 360, 363 (D.
Colo. 1986).
119. Guidry v. Sheet Metal Workers' Nat'l Pension Fund, 856 F.2d 1457 (10th Cir.
1988).
120. Guidry v. Sheet Metal Workers' Nat'l Pension Fund, 493 U.S. 365, 371 n.9 (1990).
121. Id. at 377.
122. Id.
123. 29 U.S.C. § 1109(a).
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fiduciary breaches a fiduciary duty to the plan she "shall be personally
liable to make good to such plan any losses to the plan resulting from
each such breach ... and shall be subject to such other equitable or
remedial relief as the court made deem appropriate." The Supreme
Court's disagreement was based on the facts of the case. Finding that
Guidry, who had been convicted of embezzling from the union, had
"not been found to have breached any duty to the plans them-
selves,"124 the Court concluded that § 409(a) was not applicable. The
Supreme Court did not decide whether this provision could present an
exception to the anti-alienation bar.
Both prior to and subsequent to Guidry, lower federal courts have
split on this issue.12 5 In the most recent case, the district court con-
cluded that § 409(a) did not create an exception to § 206(d)(1): "[T]he
Supreme Court's reasoning in Guidry counsels a strict application of
this anti-alienation provision."1
26
The other hotly contested alleged exception arose when plan par-
ticipants went bankrupt. The Bankruptcy Code allows a debtor to ex-
clude from his bankruptcy estate property subject to a spendthrift
provision which is enforceable under "applicable nonbankruptcy
law."'12 7 Despite the facial clarity of that provision, a substantial
number of courts concluded that "applicable nonbankruptcy law" de-
scribed only state law, not federal law.128 If participants in ERISA
plans went bankrupt and the court concluded that neither ERISA's
spendthrift provisions nor applicable state law protected the plan, the
result would be that a creditor could reach the plan assets. In Patter-
son v. Shumate,129 the district court reached just that conclusion, and
ordered the trustee to turn the participant's interest in the plan over
to his bankruptcy estate. 3 0 Somewhat surprisingly, rulings like this
persisted even after the Internal Revenue Service took the position
that a breach of the ERISA-required spendthrift provision disqualified
the entire plan.131
124. I- at 374.
125. See Coar v. Kazimfr, 792 F. Supp. 345 (D.N.J. 1992).
126. Id. at 351.
127. 11 U.S.C. § 541 (c)(2).
128. Patterson v. Shumate, 112 S. Ct. 2242, 2248 n.4 (1992).
129. 1&
130. Creasy v. Coleman Furniture Corp., 83 B.R. 404 (1988). This opinion was reversed
by the Fourth Circuit, 943 F.2d 362 (4th Cir. 1991), and the Supreme Court unani-
mously affirmed. 112 S. Ct. 2242 (1992).
131. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 81-31-020 (May 5, 1981). Subsequent private letter rulings to the
same effect include Priv. Ltr. Rul. 90-11-037 (Dec. 20, 1989); Priv. Ltr. Rul. 89-51-
067 (Sept. 28, 1989); and Priv. Ltr. Rul. 89-10-035 (Dec. 9, 1989). "The IRS has
indicated informally that, if anything, it would be more likely to actively pursue
disqualification if a plan administrator offers little or no resistance to a bank-
ruptcy trustee's request or to a proposed order for payment of plan benefits, as
opposed to a situation where the plan administrator actively contests payment."
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The Supreme Court opinion in Patterson makes short work of the
interminable and extraordinarily complex debate over the relation-
ship between the Bankruptcy Code and ERISA with reference to
spendthrift provisions.132 In Patterson, the Supreme Court described
itself as having "vigorously... enforced ERISA's prohibition on the
assignment or alienation of pension benefits, declining to recognize
any implied exceptions to the broad statutory bar." 3 3
Although Guidry and Patterson should shut down litigation over
"implied exceptions," 3 4 they leave open the possibility of exceptions
carved out by other federal statutes. Any such exception will have to
be express, however, with reference to its application to ERISA
plans.35 In Guidry, the unions relied on section 501(a) of the
LMRDA.136 The Supreme Court held, however, that even assuming
the LMRDA authorized the particular remedy of a constructive trust
for the unions, it did not authorize overriding ERISA's anti-alienation
provision. The Court held:
In our view, the two statutes are more persuasively reconciled by holding that
the LMRDA determines what sort of judgment the aggrieved party may ob-
tain, while ERISA governs the narrow question whether that judgment may
be collected through a particular means-a constructive trust placed on the
pension.
1 3 7
Guidry and Patterson highlight the complexity of law making and
decision rendering. These opinions resolved conflicting issues in a
manner consistent with our notions of separation of powers, yet also
consistent with rational public policy choices, of which separation of
powers is itself one, albeit one made by the Constitution. They deci-
sively effectuated an important act of Congress. They should deter
litigious attempts to breach ERISA's anti-alienation provision by their
announcement of a clear rule: there are no exceptions unless Con-
gress creates them. Yet it is somewhat disconcerting that this "rule" is
explained in part by a footnote reference to the congressionally cre-
ated exception of qualified domestic relations orders,138 an exception
Alan L. Aronson and Joseph B. Friedman, Jr., Creditors'Rights to Qualified Plan
Benefits, PROB. & PRop. 38, 41 (Jan./Feb. 1992). See also Patterson v. Shumate,
112 S. Ct. 2242, 2247 n.3 (1992).
132. For a chronicle of the developments in this area prior to Patterson, see Radford,
supra note 32, at 733-51.
133. 112 S. Ct. 2242, 2247 (1992).
134. See Radford, supra note 32, at 724-726, for a discussion of yet another alleged
"implied exception," that arguably arises when the beneficiary kills the plan
participant.
135. Quaere whether the regulation establishing an exception for federal tax liens, see
supra note 104, meets Patterson's criteria.
136. 29 U.S.C. § 501(a).
137. Guidry v. Sheet Metal Workers' Nat'l Pension Fund, 493 U.S. 365, 376 (1990)(em-
phasis in original).
138. Id. at 376 n.18.
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which most likely would not exist but for the determined, persistent
efforts of litigants. The message of Guidry and Patterson seems to be,
"Don't go to court, go to Congress." Quaere whether political lobbying
will prove as efficacious in illuminating and correcting inappropriate
policy choices as has litigation.
IV. CODIFYING THE COMPROMISE
A. The Wheels of Justice Grind Slowly
In jurisdictions where the validity of spendthrift provisions has
been established by judicial decision, exceptions are recognized in a
continuing patchwork of decisions. The evolution of the Florida law
on the alimony exception exemplifies this situation. 3 9
In 1947, the Florida Supreme Court recognized the validity of
spendthrift provisions.14 0 By 1984, when White v. Bacardi 4l reached
the Court of Appeals for the third district, .no legislation limiting or
qualifying the validity of spendthrift provisions had been enacted.142
The trust at issue had been created in 1971, during the defendant's
first marriage, by the defendant's father. The income beneficiaries
were the defendant and his three children. The marriage between the
defendant and the petitioner had lasted for two years. They had no
children. In the property settlement incorporated in the divorce de-
cree, the defendant had agreed to pay his wife alimony of $2000.00 per
month. Armed with judgments for unpaid alimony in the amount of
$14,000 and attorney's fees in the amount of $1,000, the petitioner had
obtained an order authorizing a continuing garnishment against the
trust income.1 43
The Bacardi court recognized that the Restatement position, which
would have allowed the claim, purported to represent the majority
view in 1935. Citing critics of that position, however, the court
"align[ed] with what appears to be both the modern trend and the best
reasoned view,"1 44 holding that a divorced wife could only reach trust
assets in the hands of the trustee if she could show "by competent and
139. Florida is not the only state to take a torturous path toward resolution of these
issues. See Gary E. Dienstag, The Spendthrift Trust A Fortress Against Claims
for Child Support and Maintenance?, 73 ILL. B.J. 648 (Aug. 1985)(the caption to
the article reads: "Illinois law has long been unsettled over the troublesome issue
of whether spendthrift trusts can be attached directly to provide and collect child
support or maintenance. The Non-Support Act as well as a recent landmark deci-
sion by the Illinois Supreme Court have now settled the issue in favor of collec-
tion of those obligations. Questions remain, however, about whether the
spendthrift fortress has truly fallen").
140. Waterbury v. Munn, 32 So. 2d 603 (Fla. 1947).
141. 446 So. 2d 150 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1984), rev'd, 463 So. 2d 218 (Fla. 1985).
142. Id. at 153.
143. Id. at 152.
144. Id. at 156.
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substantial evidence that it was the settlor's intent that she participate
as a beneficiary."145 Florida law was hardly clarified by the opinion,
however, in view of the court's disclaimer:
We do not decide whether the income of a spendthrift trust may be reached to
support a wife where there has been no dissolution of marriage, or where
there are dependent children. On those questions, public policy may be
clearer. Neither do we decide whether there are any equitable circumstances
where a spendthrift trust should be defeated, as a policy matter, in order to
provide reasonably for an alimony-debtor ex-spouse. On the record before us
no special circumstances are presented.
14 6
Had Florida law been settled, the calm would have been remarka-
bly short lived. A scant three days later the District Court of Appeal
for the second district reached a contrary decision. In Gilbert v. Gil-
bert,147 the court dealt with a claim by an ex-wife for $50,500 arrear-
ages in alimony and medical expenses, and $18,000 in attorney's fees.
The opinion offers scant facts about the relationship between the par-
ties, but the wife's medical expenses were attributable to her multiple
sclerosis, and the husband is described as having "fled the jurisdic-
tion."14s The court goes on:
He is now thought to be living in England. The husband also removed his
assets from the state, thereby thwarting the wife's efforts to collect the arrear-
ages .... 4 9 [Tihe instrument provides for the husband to receive $50,000 from
the corpus of the trust together with accrued income each December 10 until
the corpus is exhausted.... [Bly the time the garnishment judgment was en-
tered.., the bank was holding more than $100,000 which was payable to the
husband under the trust.15 0
Faced with these compelling facts, the court held that the former
wife could reach the trust assets, the spendthrift provision notwith-
standing, and that a continuing garnishment would lie.' 5 1 Judge
Lehan, writing separately, would have expressly limited the opinion to
the situation "where the ex-wife has recourse... against no property
of the ex-husband, and invasion of the spendthrift trust is the last re-
sort."15 2 He also would "specifically limit the application of this deci-
sion to the trust now before us, to other existing spendthrift trusts
which are revocable and can be changed, and to spendthrift trusts cre-
ated after the date of this decision."
1 53
A year later the Florida Supreme Court affirmed Gilbert'5 4 and
145. Id.
146. Id. at 156 n.7.
147. 447 So. 2d 299 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1984), affd sub non. Southeast Bank v. Gilbert,
463 So. 2d 223 (Fla. 1985).
148. Id. at 300.
149. Id.
150. Id. at 302.
151. Id
152. Id. at 303 (Lehan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
153. Id.
154. Southeast Bank v. Gilbert, 463 So. 2d 223 (Fla. 1985).
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reversed Bacardi.55 Two theories underlie decisions allowing claims
for alimony against assets protected by spendthrift provisions. The
first theory is that the claimant is within the class the settlor sought to
favor or expected to benefit. The second theory is that, notwithstand-
ing the settlor's intent not to allow this claimant to reach the assets,
public policy demands an exception be made. The Bacardi court chose
the latter theory. The court also affirmed the right of the claimant to
collect attorney's fees as well as alimony arrearages, and to use a con-
tinuing garnishment in these circumstances. However, the court re-
stricted the breadth of its opinion by adopting Judge Lehan's view that
spendthrift trust assets could only be reached when all other means
had failed. The retroactivity issue was not discussed.56
The inevitable complexity of litigation emerges strikingly in these
two cases. It is notable that Florida recognized spendthrift provisions
in 1947157 and nearly 40 years elapsed before this fundamental ques-
tion-whether the spendthrift provision bars alimony claimants-was
decided. Furthermore, while the decisions resolve three basic issues-
alimony claims are public policy exceptions, a continuing garnishment
will lie, and attorney's fees may be included-they leave open the
question of retroactivity, and create the "other assets are available"
defense, which is certain to protract litigation in some cases.
A judicially created exception grounded in public policy may also
exist when the spendthrift provision derives its validity from a statute,
at least where the statute itself contains no exceptions. When the stat-
ute addresses the problem by providing certain exceptions, a strong
argument can be made that the public policy issues have been resolved
by the legislature, and the court has no room in which to act. Where
no exceptions are provided, however, a court may conclude that the
legislature did not address the issue, and did not intend to preclude
certain claims. ERISA, for example, when first enacted, contained a
blanket anti-alienation provision and no alimony or child support ex-
ception. Nonetheless, virtually every court which confronted this is-
sue found that a child support exception existed.1Ss Congress
concurred in this construction of the ERISA anti-alienation provision
when it enacted the Retirement Equity Act of 1984159 and included an
exception for "qualified domestic relations orders." 160
The history of domestic relations claimants' success against spend-
thrift provisions--even in the teeth of federal regulation-indicates
155. Bacardi v. White, 463 So. 2d 218 (Fla. 1985).
156. Id
157. Waterbury v. Munn, 32 So. 2d 603 (Fla. 1947).
158. See Radford, supra note 32 at 722-23; Sherman, supra note 32, at 272-73.
159. Pub. L. 98-397, § 104(a), 98 Stat. 1426, 1433-36 (codified at 29 U.S.C.A.
§ 1056(d)(3)(A)-(N)(Supp. 1992); Pub. L. 98-397, § 204(a), 98 Stat. 1445 (codified at
26 U.S.C.A. § 401(a)(13)(8)(Supp. 1992).
160. ERISA § 206(d)(3), 29 U.S.C. § 1056(d)(3)(1988); I.R.C. §§ 401(a)(13), 414(p)(1988).
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that the common law works. It does. Unfortunately, it works slowly
and at great cost. The economic cost of litigation does not fall solely
on the claimant. In some cases, particularly those involving domestic
relations orders, the claimants attorney's fees may be recoverable
from the trust.161 In all cases, the expenses of defending the lawsuit
on behalf of the trust are borne by the trust.16 2 Society itself incurs
significant costs in providing the forum and the adjudicator.
Litigation, as expensive as it is, solves problems at an exceedingly
slow rate. It is an inherently piecemeal process. Courts sit to resolve
particular disputes on their facts. Related issues that are either not
presented or do not require resolution to dispose of the case at hand
are ordinarily not addressed. When related issues are addressed, the
court's comments are not binding.163 Thus, each claimant is required
to press his own claim, and to counter the defendant's inevitable argu-
ment that, since this claim is different from those that have been de-
cided, this claim should not be allowed.164
Granted, some "enforceable" claims probably should not be al-
lowed. Were Solomon to resurrect himself, he would pick out worthy
claims and dismiss unworthy ones. However, once it has been estab-
lished that a claim is "enforceable" and that a debt is "legitimate,"
sorting out those that public policy demands approval of from those
less compelling is a game not worth the price of the ticket. The costs
are simply too high.
B. A Proposal for a Statutory Solution
More than 50 years ago Erwin Griswold proposed a model spend-
thrift trust statute. Quickly adopted in Louisiana and Oklahoma, it
then fell into desuetude.165 The Griswold proposal first provides that
spendthrift provisions are valid and enforceable, and then severely
limits their reach. All income over $5000, and 10% of income over $12
per week can be alienated or attached.166 Even those protections are
overridden when the claim is for alimony, child support, necessaries,
or a tort; then the court can allow the creditor to reach whatever trust
161. Gilbert v. Gilbert, 447 So. 2d 299, 303 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1984), aff'd sub nom
Southeast Bank v. Gilbert, 463 So. 2d 223 (Fla. 1985).
162. This assumes the trustee commits no breach in determining to mount a defense.
163. They may have enormous effect, however. Witness the dicta in Nichols v. Eaton,
91 U.S. 716 (1875).
164. These criticisms of litigation could be raised in virtually any context. My pur-
pose, however, is not to attack litigation as a conflict resolution process in gen-
eral. Rather, I am contending that because the recognition of spendthrift
provisions is an anomaly, the adversely affected claimant should not have to bear
the burden of litigation in order to establish the enforceability of a claim.
165. BOGERT & BOGERT, supra note 82, at 420, 436; Wicker, supra note 14, at 15, 18.
166. GRISWOLD TREATISE, supra note 12, at 648, (Model Act § 2(a)(b)).
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income the court finds to be "just under the circumstances." 67 The
spendthrift provision does not protect the beneficiary's interest in the
principal, only in the income.
1 68
The Griswold proposal has not proven politically viable, perhaps
because it gives with one hand and takes away with the other. Spend-
thrift provisions are valid, but only the first $5,000 of income is pro-
tected, and the provision may be completely overridden for certain
claimants. Whatever the merits of this plan in terms of fairness, it
does not satisfy the proponents of spendthrift provisions. It also suf-
fers from two other significant flaws. First, by using sum certains
($5,000 per year and $12.00 per week) to determine what amounts are
protected in the first instance, the statute is vulnerable to becoming
outdated by inflation or recession. 16 9 Second, by providing that fa-
vored claimants can recover what a court determines to be just, it
forces them into litigation they may not be able to afford. If the mat-
ter is litigated, the trust itself will be further depleted by its share of
the costs.
Several things are now clear. First, most jurisdictions approve
spendthrift provisions in concept. Second, those that do find certain
creditors' claims compelling. Any class of creditors can present an in-
dividual with a claim that equity finds overwhelming. What of the
paralyzed father/construction worker, unable to support his family,
injured by a reckless driver with a long history of traffic violations?
What of the widow/shopkeeper, struggling to keep her own family
afloat, who has extended credit on account to the seemingly affluent
scion of the town's most substantial family? They are tort and con-
tract creditors, ordinarily less favored by the law of spendthrift
provisions.
The converse is true as well-a class ordinarily favored may in-
clude an unworthy claimant. An alimony claimant may have been a
contributing partner in a long standing marriage, or may be a schemer
who marries and quickly divorces a vulnerable, albeit wealthy, benefi-
ciary. Quaere whether it makes sense to separate out claimants with
enforceable claims according to the class of creditor to which they be-
long. Enforceability itself should insure some measure of "justness."
Forcing virtually every claimant to litigate the merits of her claim is
both grossly inefficient and grossly unfair.
A true compromise is called for-a compromise that constricts, if
not eliminates, the need for litigation of claims and provides creditors
with an efficient method of obtaining some satisfaction of their claims,
but a compromise that also protects the essence of the spendthrift pro-
167. Id (Model Act § 2(c)).
168. I at 649 (Model Act § 4).
169. Virginia uses the sum certain approach, but the protected amount is $500,000. VA.
CODE ANN. § 55-19 (Michie Supp. 1992).
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vision by insulating a significant portion of the beneficiary's interest in
the trust. True compromise requires giving something up. If my pro-
posal were enacted, the creditor would lose the right to seek the recov-
ery of more than the statutory limit, that is, to ask the court to order a
transfer of however much is "just under the circumstances," even if
that be the beneficiary's entire interest. In return, the creditor is
freed of the burden of litigating his claim. To make that bargain
worthwhile, in cases where the obduracy of the trustee results in the
creditor being forced to litigate, the creditor should be entitled to re-
cover the costs of the litigation, including attorney fees.
I would retain the venerable rule that a settlor cannot create a
valid spendthrift provision for her own benefit. If possible, I would
have one rule with no exceptions,170 but that is not possible.171 ER-
ISA trusts are exceptions; no state law can affect that.172 Because
they are, I would level that playing field and create an exception for
all bona fide retirement or pension trusts.173 To do otherwise leaves
participants in ERISA qualified plans with an irrational advantage
over other working people.174 In sum, I would propose a statute along
the following lines:175
Spendthrift Provisions
(a) A spendthrift provision is a provision in a trust that the interest of the
beneficiary in the income or in the principal or in both may not be voluntarily
or involuntarily transferred before payment or delivery of the interest to the
beneficiary by the trustee.
(b) Except as otherwise provided in this subsection, a spendthrift provi-
sion is valid and enforceable.
(1) A spendthrift provision is not valid if the beneficiary is the settlor.
(2) A spendthrift provision is not valid with reference to one-third
17 6
of any distribution of principal or income to the beneficiary.
(c) In any case in which the trustee refuses to honor a claim and a creditor
brings suit to enforce the creditor's right to recover from the trust pursuant to
170. I would not, for example, create an exception for handicapped beneficiaries.
171. Federal tax liens are also an exception, but a state statute need not expressly take
them into account. See supra note 92 and accompanying text.
172. See Patterson v. Shumate, 112 S. Ct. 2242 (1992).
173. An exception is necessary to avoid the argument that a pension or retirement
trust is fully or partially self-settled. See Sherman, supra note 32. To control
abuse of the exception, it is limited to "bona fide" retirement or pension funds.
174. Some retirement plans, most notably state government plans, are not ERISA
qualified because they do not need to qualify for tax purposes; others, most nota-
bly individual accounts, are not ERISA qualified because they do not come within
the scope of the statute.
175. This proposal is modeled on the spendthrift provision section in the Georgia
Trust Act of 1991. GA. CODE ANN. § 53-12-28 (Michie Supp. 1992). Sections (a)
and (d) are verbatim. I am indebted to the sub-committee members who worked
on that section for their input into this proposal. They are Michael Alembik,
Henry L. Bowden, Jr., Herbert Elsas, Barbara Hipple, Albert Reichert, and
James C. Rehburg.
176. Obviously, this figure may be adjusted as legislatures deem appropriate.
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this statute and the court enters a judgment in favor of the creditor, the credi-
tor shall be entitled to recover costs and attorney's fees from the trust. Recov-
ery under this subsection shall be in addition to recovery under subsection (b).
(d) Notwithstanding any other provision in this Code section to the con-
trary, a spendthrift provision in a bona fide pension or retirement trust is valid
and enforceable with reference to the entire interest of the beneficiary in the
income or in the principal or in both, even if the beneficiary is also the settlor
of the trust, except where a claim is made pursuant to a qualified domestic
relations order as defined in 26 U.S.C. § 414(p), or any subsequent statute of
similar import. 17 7
V. CONCLUSION
"The life of the law has not been logic: it has been experience."'' 8
Logic, to my mind, impels the conclusion that spendthrift provisions
are invalid. Gray's arguments carry the day. Experience, on the other
hand, teaches that they are valid. The current of history has swept
away Gray's position without refuting it. Spendthrift provisions may
be theoretically suspect; they are, nonetheless, not only valid but also
thriving.
Writing on a clean slate, I would severely constrict the reach of
spendthrift provisions, were I to approve of them at all. Writing in the
face of their all but universal acceptance, however, I counsel a prag-
matic approach. Allow creditors to claim a percentage of each distri-
bution-enough to be significant, but not so much as to frustrate the
settlor's goal of taking care of the beneficiary. Some may complain
that one-third is too low, and surely it will be in some cases. Just as
surely, in others, it may seem too high. But for the most part it strikes
a balance that recognizes the interests of the settlor, the beneficiary,
and the creditor.179 In this highly complex age, certainty has its costs.
Sometimes the costs are worth it.
177. If the trust is not a bonafude pension or retirement trust, then to the extent that
the assets represent contributions of the beneficiary, the trust is self-settled and
the spendthrift provision is not valid. Assets representing contributions from any
other source would be subject to subsections a-c.
178. OuvER WENDELL HoLMES, TaE COMMON LAW (1881).
179. This proposal equalizes the positions of all creditors with enforceable claims, and
of all beneficiaries. The beneficiary who is in fact a spendthrift is afforded no
special protection. That troubles me not at all. Nor is the beneficiary who is
disabled, and unable to fully care for herself. That troubles me not a little. Some
jurisdictions have special rules for disabled beneficiaries. See GA. CODE ANN.
§ 53-12-28(c)(Michie 1992 Supp.); VA. CODE ANN. § 55-19(D)(2)(Michie 1991
Supp.); I have rejected that approach because the concept of disability, necessarily
elastic, creates an issue of fact requiring litigation for its resolution.
